On August 14, 2026, Luigi Mangione pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to two counts of stalking resulting in death. His plea was an open one; the U.S. Attorney’s office made a point of saying there were “no accommodations or concessions” and that the government remains “free to seek the maximum penalty.” The maximum sentence is life in prison. The case arrived in that posture because Judge Garnett had already dismissed the 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) murder count and its companion firearms count in January. Applying the (always controversial) “modified categorical approach,” the judge held that federal stalking is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). That ruling took the death penalty off the table. Sentencing on the stalking charges is set for December 18, 2026, and his state case has been postponed indefinitely.
For stalking with a deadly weapon that results in bodily harm, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would normally provide a sentence of roughly three years in prison. But like many guidelines, the stalking Guideline contains a “cross reference”: if the offense “involved” a more serious offense that has a more severe guideline, the judge should cross-reference and apply the severe guideline. Here, that is obviously first-degree murder and its Guideline, §2A1.1. First-degree murder has a “base offense level” of 43, the highest in the Guidelines Manual and associated with a life sentence.
Mangione will argue that the judge should not cross-reference at all (or should cross-reference to a less severe guideline), that he should receive a 3-level reduction for accepting responsibility, and that the judge should vary downward for various mitigating reasons that his defense team will argue.
Prosecutors will likely argue that the cross-referenced murder Guideline, and all conceivable enhancements, should apply. While §2A1.1 has no specific enhancements, I expect the government to comb through Chapter 3 enhancements in the Guidelines Manual, including possibly the terrorism enhancement, which would add 12 levels (though the application of that enhancement here is dubious for reasons I might explain in a later post). Level 43 is the highest that the Guidelines technically allow in formal calculations, but the government’s goal is typically to get the offense level as high as possible so that any haircut the judge does grant will still put Mangione comfortably at or around a level 43, and a life sentence. (It is worth noting that apparently the government’s preliminary calculations estimated a Guidelines range of 24–30 years in prison (which is the range for an offense level of 40), though prosecutors will still likely seek a life sentence. We will know when prosecutors file their sentencing memorandum on or before December 11, 2026.)
The Guidelines give prosecutors an additional argument for a life sentence, and this is where a seemingly unrelated SCOTUS case comes in. Below the text of many of the formal Guidelines, the Manual includes “commentary” that assists judges in interpreting and applying the Guidelines. In the commentary after the murder Guideline, the Sentencing Commission tells sentencing judges: “In the case of premeditated killing, life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence if a sentence of death is not imposed.” That is the sentence prosecutors will almost certainly quote in December.
This brings us to Beaird v. United States, in which the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and will hear oral argument on October 13, 2026. The question in Beaird is essentially this: What level of deference, if any, should judges give to Sentencing Guidelines commentary? (Notably, the government in both Beaird and Mangione will argue that significant deference should be given to Guidelines commentary.) Circuits have split on the question, giving varying levels of deference to the Guidelines commentary. All of this is against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s more formalist turn in administrative law and skepticism of deference to administrative agencies (though I show here how the Sentencing Commission is meaningfully different from Executive Branch agencies and therefore different doctrines should apply).
Beaird should tell us whether the judge must at least consider the commentary, and how persuasive it should be. If Judge Garnett states on the record to Mangione that she is imposing a life sentence based principally on Note 2 of this Guidelines commentary, and the Supreme Court holds next spring in Beaird that judges should give little or no weight to the commentary, Beaird could help Mangione when he appeals. (To give themselves cover on claims like this, most judges state on the record some version of “I would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Sentencing Guidelines,” a controversial statement that some appellate courts credit and others do not.)
But there are a few practical problems for Mangione. United States v. Booker already rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory only, and, assuming Judge Garnett gives sufficient reasons, she can vary from the Guidelines (and by extension, the commentary) under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) no matter how much deference applies. What Beaird would change is the rhetorical and doctrinal weight of the government’s ask. Additionally, the commentary is not doing all the work here: level 43 or higher produces a life sentence even without commentary.
According to the Sentencing Commission’s data for the past five fiscal years, in Second Circuit cases sentenced under the murder Guideline, the average sentence imposed on individuals in the lowest criminal history category (like Mangione) was 238 months (20 years), with a median about the same (240 months). But many of those individuals received departures from their Guidelines calculations for things like substantially assisting the government, which Mangione won’t receive. Assuming no enhancements apply and that Mangione receives the typical credit for accepting responsibility (putting him at a level 40), the average sentence across the country for similarly situated offenders was 263 months (22 years) (median 252 months). Thus, Beaird probably will not help Luigi Mangione, but his best approach seems less complicated: convince Judge Garnett that he is no worse than the average §2A1.1 offender.
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