On October 3, 2025, a federal judge in Maryland sentenced Sophie Roske, who planned to assassinate Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, to 97 months (eight years) in prison plus a lifetime of supervised release. The sentence immediately sparked outrage—the government had requested a minimum of 30 years in prison.
Roske had many unfavorable facts. Beginning as early as January 2022, Roske searched for information on mass shootings and serial killers. After the leak of the draft Supreme Court’s opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, these searches intensified and became much more specific. Roske conducted over 100 firearms-related searches, including for the “quietest semi auto rifle” and “best silencers for glock 17.” The research expanded into assassination techniques, with queries like “most effective way to silently kill someone” and “how much force do you need to stab someone’s neck.” Roske also researched breaking and entering, looking up “how to break glass quietly” and “best way to break into a house.”
Roske then acquired an arsenal to carry out this plan. Over several weeks, Roske purchased a Glock 17 pistol, ammunition, a tactical knife, zip ties, pepper spray, a crowbar, a hammer, and other burglary tools. Roske then booked a flight from California to Washington, D.C., packed the weapons, and traveled across the country. After arriving at Justice Kavanaugh’s home in a taxi around 1:00 AM, Roske spotted two Deputy U.S. Marshals stationed outside and phoned her sister who convinced Roske to turn herself in.
Guideline Calculations
Roske pleaded guilty to Attempting to Assassinate a Justice of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 351(c), a crime that carries a statutory maximum penalty of life in prison. The government’s proposed sentence relied on a rather straightforward application of harsh guidelines. The calculation in prosecutors’ sentencing memorandum began with a Base Offense Level of 33 under U.S. Sentencing Guideline §2A2.1(a) for Attempted Murder. To this, prosecutors suggested adding 12 levels for the “terrorism” enhancement under §3A1.4(a), arguing the offense was intended to “influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion.” After a standard -3 level reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility (§3E1.1), the Total Offense Level was 42. The terrorism enhancement also automatically elevated Roske’s Criminal History Category from I (for having no prior criminal record) to VI, the highest possible category typically reserved for hardened career criminals. This resulted in an advisory Guideline range of 360 months (30 years) to Life. (Under the Guidelines, a Total Offense Level of 42 yields that same range regardless of the Criminal History Category.)
Not surprisingly, the defense argued that the terrorism enhancement was inapplicable, or if it technically applied, was wholly unjust under these circumstances. For the defense, that enhancement was intended for terrorists like those on 9/11, not confused youths who turn themselves in.
Judge Deborah Boardman apparently spoke for two hours about her reasons for the eight-year sentence. The Judge considered many mitigating factors, including that Roske was suffering from a mental-health crisis at the time, was improperly mixing medications, and turned herself in. We await the transcript of the hearing to see exactly what was said, but it has been reported that the Judge did consider the fact that Sophie Roske, born Nicholas Roske and recently transitioned, will be detained in a male-only facility and would not likely receive adequate mental-health treatment or gender-affirming care while incarcerated.
Political Backlash
Vehement criticism of the sentence commenced as soon as it was handed down. Attorney General Pamela Bondi said that “[t]he Department of Justice will be appealing the woefully insufficient sentence imposed by the district court, which does not reflect the horrific facts of this case.” Senator Ted Cruz went even further, calling for the impeachment of Judge Boardman and speculating that the basis for the sentence was “because this left-wing judge said that the attempted murderer was transgender, and because he identifies as transgender, apparently it’s OK to try to kill a Supreme Court justice, if your politics are sufficiently woke.” Sarah Isgur from the Advisory Opinions podcast speculated that the reason for the sentence and transgender references was because the judge might be angling for elevation to the circuit court during the next Democratic presidential administration.
Politicians and pundits never waste an opportunity for a good headline, and transgender issues are easy prizes in 2025. But the reality of this sentencing hearing is far more boring: transgenderism likely played little to no role in the ultimate sentence.
As an initial matter, as I have written elsewhere, it is an amateur’s error to rely too heavily on the parties’ proposed Guidelines or suggested sentences when criticizing a sentence. They are zealous advocates arguing for two extremes, often knowing that the judge will never agree but hoping that the judge will “split the baby.” As in the recent Sean “Diddy” Combs sentencing, the judge rejected both parties’ more extreme proposals and independently calculated and applied other guidelines. In this case, instead of quote-mining statements by the Judge for sensational lines from this hours-long hearing and then comparing the prosecutors’ request of 30 years to the imposed sentence of eight years, the appropriate comparators are, according to Congress, similar offenders in other cases found guilty of similar conduct. (Data on that below.)
Additionally, it is appropriate for judges to consider the conditions of confinement when fashioning an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and it would be interesting to see the Commission explore on this issue more in the future. The Supreme Court confirmed the permissibility of such considerations in cases like Koon v. United States (1996). Put plainly, serving two years in prison under normal federal conditions is qualitatively different from serving two years under COVID-like lockdowns, which is different from serving two years in CECOT in El Salvador. Relevant here, USSG §5H1.4 allows for the consideration of the offender’s physical condition, and the Court in Koon determined that is not impermissible for judges to factor in an offender’s “diminutive size, immature appearance, and bisexual orientation” when considering the “susceptibility to abuse in prison.”
In this case, I don’t believe that under current law and Guidelines, Roske’s transgenderism supports a substantial variance downward from an otherwise applicable Guideline range. If the Guideline range was indeed calculated to be at or over 30 years and the basis of the eight-year sentence was primarily justified by her transgenderism (as the critics claim), such a sentence would probably be reversed on appeal. But transgenderism was almost certainly not a significant justification for Roske’s eight-year sentence.
Instead, Judge Boardman seems to have simply disagreed with the application of the controversial terrorism enhancement. The defense attorneys correctly pointed out in their sentencing memorandum that trial and appellate courts have been highly critical of the harshness of the terrorism enhancement for decades. It appears that the Judge did calculate the Guideline range to technically include the enhancement (Politico reports that “Boardman called the crime an act of terrorism”), which resulted in a Guideline range of 360 months to life. But what would the Guideline range be if the Judge had rejected the application of the terrorism enhancement?
Roske’s Base Offense Level for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 351(c) is 33. Reducing this by three levels for her acceptance of responsibility (§3E1.1) results in a total offense level of 30. Without the terrorism enhancement’s dramatic increase in Criminal History Category to the highest category of VI, Roske’s Criminal History Category would be the lowest, I. This results in a Guideline range of . . . 97–121 months.
Most federal sentences are at or below the Guideline range, with the bottom end of the Guideline range “anchoring” judges’ sentences. Judge Boardman seems to simply have believed that under the text of the Guidelines, the terrorism enhancement technically needed to be calculated, but because the application in this case would be unjust (which is within her discretion, assuming she articulated adequate reasons), she nullified its effect by imposing a downward variance as if the enhancement did not apply. It is therefore no surprise that the resulting sentence was 97 months—the bottom end of the Guideline range without the enhancement.
If transgenderism was somehow driving the ultimate sentence, I would expect to see a more modest variance below 360 months, or one below 97 months (no terrorism enhancement plus a reduction related to transgenderism or conditions of confinement). Consider a counterfactual. If all other facts were the same and this wasn’t a transgender offender, I suspect that this Judge would have also imposed a sentence exactly at the bottom end of the Guideline range with the terrorism enhancement removed. The fact that the sentence is exactly 97 months suggests that this sentence is much more about the appropriateness of the terrorism enhancement, not transgenderism. (As I have discussed elsewhere, the terrorism enhancement was also relevant in many of the sentences imposed on January 6, 2021 “Capitol Breach” offenders. Prosecutors sought the enhancement in some cases, but judges only applied it on a couple of the most extreme cases. All Capitol Breach offenders eventually received presidential pardons or commutations.)
According to the Sentencing Commission’s data, the average sentence length for other offenders sentenced under the unenhanced Guideline at issue here (§2A2.1) is 107 months—on the lower-middle end of the Guideline range. Thus, looking at comparators for other attempted murderers for whom the terrorism enhancement did not apply, Judge Boardman’s sentence of 97 months is not far off.
Because the victim is a Supreme Court Justice, should Roske receive a harsher punishment than the average attempted murderer? Certainly defensible. (To the extent that statutory maximums are persuasive on the issue, Congress punishes the former much harsher than the latter.) Should we completely ignore the policy reasons behind the terrorism enhancement if it otherwise applies? Probably not. But Roske likely has weighty mitigating factors that would also factor into the decision. Sentencing is hard.
If this sentence gets remanded (and it certainly could), it will likely be based on the more technical issue of completely nullifying the terrorism enhancement, not the more salacious references from the hearing. Perhaps claims like that are why I am better suited to being a law professor than a politician.
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